State of Utah v. Mark Workman : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Mark Workman : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Workman, No. 20040972 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5361
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK WORKMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040972-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
Counsel for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK WORKMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040972-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WORKMAN'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR QUASH BINDOVER FOR 
IMPROPER VENUE 8 
A. Workman did not have control of the vehicle in Utah County. . . . 9 
B. Workman did not have constructive possession of the vehicle in 
Utah County 10 
C. The testimony presented showed that every element of the 
crime charged occurred in Salt Lake County 12 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 13 
ADDENDA 14 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-202 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss/Quash Bindover 
Motion to Dismiss/Quash Bindover 
State's Response to Motion 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
United States Constitution, Amend. VI 8 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12 8 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-202 8 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-l-202(l)(b) 8, 9 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-l-202(l)(g)(iii) 9 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 2 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
Cases Cited 
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302 (Utah 1992) 9, 10 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1992) 9 
State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977) 1,12 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 11 
State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 108 P.3d 710 1 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911 10 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 1 
i i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK WORKMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040972-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Workman's motion to dismiss or 
quash bindover on grounds of improper venue? This issue presents a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). See also State 
v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 108 P.3d 710; State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977). This 
issue was preserved in a written motion to dismiss or quash bindover (R. 65-73). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mark D. Workman appeals from the October 14, 2004, judgment, sentence, and 
commitment of the Fourth District Court after he entered a conditional plea to theft of 
stolen property, a class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Mark D. Workman was charged by Information filed in Fourth Judicial District 
Court on February 24, 2000, of theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 (R. 3). 
On March 6, 2003, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard. The State proffered the testimony of Rebecca Roberts and called Detective 
Todd Mallinson to testify. The trial court found probable cause and bound the matter 
over for trial. (R. 57). 
On April 14, 2003, Workman filed a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or in 
the alternative Motion to Quash Bindover Order. (R. 65-73). On April 18, 2003, the State 
filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bindover. (R 74-84). On 
May 8, 2003, a motion hearing was held before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. The 
court took the motion under advisement. (R. 88). 
On May 21, 2003, Judge Howard issued a written ruling denying Workman's 
motion (R. 90). The trial court specifically concluded as follows: "Noting the facts 
relative to the incident in question and submitted authorities; the Court is persuaded by 
Plaintiffs arguments and authorities which the Court adopts and incorporates in this 
Ruling. Defendant's Motions, therefore, are respectfully denied" (R. 90). 
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On December 4, 2003, Workman, through his attorney, gave notice of his intent to 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals the decision by the court against Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss for Improper Venue, signed by the court on May 4, 2003 (R. 147). On June 
22, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Order of Dismissal (Case No. 20030992-
CA) for failure of Appellant to file the attachments to the docketing statement (R. 157). 
On October 14, 2004, entered a "no-contest" plea to theft by receiving, a class A 
misdemeanor, conditioned upon his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
dismiss/motion to quash the bindover (R. 166-169, 170-73). At this time, Workman was 
also sentenced to 36 months probation, 7 days work diversion in the Utah County Jail, 
and he was ordered to pay a $525.00 fine and restitution of $2000.00 (R. 175-77). 
However, the trial court stayed the sentencing order, pursuant to the parties' agreement, 
until after this appeal (R. 200: 11). 
On November 9, 2004, Workman filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court 
(R. 182). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Proffered Testimony of Rebecca Roberts 
On December 13, 1999, at about 8:00 a.m., Roberts' 1998 Mitsubishi Mirage was 
stolen from in front of her house in the Salt Lake County area. Roberts reported the theft 
to the police on that day. (R. 196:6). 
The value of the vehicle, new, was $14,500 and on the date of the theft of the 
vehicle on December 13, her insurance company valued the vehicle at $9,282. (R. 196:6). 
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Roberts does not know the defendant, did not give him permission to have the 
vehicle at any time, and did not give permission for anyone to take the vehicle from her 
home on the morning of December 13, 1999. (R. 196:6). 
B. Testimony of Detective Todd Mallinson 
Detective Todd Mallinson has been employed by the Orem Police Department for 
about 12 years. (R. 196:7). Mallinson worked in the Major Crimes Task Force from 
September of 1999 to December of 2002. (R. 196:8). 
Mallinson was on duty January 7, 2000. (R. 196:8). He was on routine patrol in 
the area of 1200 West and Center in Orem when he observed a female on the pay phone. 
"She appeared to be very nervous and quick movement, looking around, just acting 
suspicious." (R. 196:8). Mallinson set up surveillance across the street to watch when she 
left(R. 196:8). 
When the female left, she got into a black Mitsubishi Mirage. (R. 196:9). 
Mallinson began following her when she pulled out. The driver made a wide turn, going 
through several lanes of traffic onto Center Street and entering the 1-15 freeway. The 
driver proceeded southbound. Mallinson followed her in the slow lane. The driver 
crossed over the fog line several times and exited the freeway at the 12th South exit in 
Orem.(R. 196:9). 
The erratic driving behavior caused Mallinson to be concerned that the driver was 
intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. This concern led him to initiate a traffic 
stop. (R. 196:9). 
The driver exited the freeway at 12th South and proceeded to get right back on the 
southbound 1-15 freeway. The driver pulled over just after the on ramp. (R. 196:9). 
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Mallinson was in an unmarked car. (R. 196:9). His red and blue lights were in the 
headlights. (R. 196:10). 
During the stop, the driver identified herself as Holly Armstrong. She did not have 
a driver's license. She could not provide Mallinson with the vehicle registration or proof 
of insurance. (R. 196: 10). Mallinson indicated to Armstrong that he had run the 
registration on the vehicle, and there was some concern because the vehicle was not 
registered in her name. (R. 196: 10). 
Mallinson returned to his vehicle and ran routine checks on Armstrong and the 
vehicle. (R. 196: 10). Dispatch confirmed the vehicle was stolen and listed on NCIC. (R. 
196: 10). When Mallinson received this information, he went up to the vehicle, had 
Armstrong exit the vehicle, and placed her under arrest for possession of a stolen vehicle. 
(R. 196: 11). 
Armstrong was informed of Miranda rights. Armstrong waived her rights and 
stated that she would speak to Mallinson. (R. 196: 11). Armstrong said she received the 
vehicle from an individual by the name of Mark, and she told Mallinson she did not know 
his last name. Later Armstrong told Mallinson that she thought the name was Mark 
Workman. (R. 196: 12). 
Mallinson asked Armstrong if she had a phone number for Workman so that he 
could contact him to verify the story. Mallinson used his cell phone to call Workman and 
spoke to him about the case. (R. 196: 12). At the time of the phone call, Mallinson 
believed that Workman was at his residence at 1044 Quail Park Drive in Murray; 
however, he was not sure that Workman was actually in that location. (R. 196: 14). 
Mallinson testified that the phone rang and an individual, a male, answered the 
phone and when Mallinson asked to speak to Mark Workman the caller said he was Mark 
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Workman. (R. 196: 13). Mallinson then asked him if he knew a Holly Armstrong and 
Workman said yes, that he had been friends with Armstrong for three or four months. 
Mallinson then asked him if he had loaned her a vehicle, the black Mitsubishi Mirage, 
and Workman said yes he had loaned it to her earlier that day, about five o'clock, in Salt 
Lake City. (R. 196: 13). Mallinson then asked Workman if he knew the vehicle was 
stolen. Workman said, no, he did not know the vehicle was stolen. Mallinson asked 
Workman where he obtained the vehicle from, and Workman said he obtained the vehicle 
from an individual by the name of Travis. Mallinson asked if Workman knew Travis's 
last name, and Workman said he believed it started with an M. Workman then proceeded 
to tell Mallinson that the name that he purchased the vehicle from was on the title, which 
was in the glove box of the car. (R. 196: 14). 
Mallinson found the title in the glove box. (R. 196: 15). The name on the title was 
Travis Daddow. The title was for a 1979 Volkswagen. The title showed the address of 
the registered owner as 8915 West 2800 South, No. 3 in Magna. (R. 196: 16). When 
Mallinson found the title, he further questioned Workman. (R. 196: 16). 
Mallinson told Workman the title was for a Volkswagen. Workman responded by 
saying that he had not got around to looking at the title close. Mallinson then told 
Workman that if he had purchased a vehicle, he would make sure that the title was to the 
vehicle that he was purchasing. (R. 196: 16). Workman made no response. Mallinson 
asked Workman how much he paid for the vehicle, and he told him he had paid a total of 
$3,600 for the vehicle. Workman said he put $900 down and he still owed the remainder. 
(R. 196: 18). When Mallinson asked Workman how he could get in touch with Travis, 
Workman said he did not know, that he believed Travis was in either prison or in jail. (R. 
196: 18). 
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At that point, Mallinson felt that Workman was being evasive and that he did not 
want to answer any more questions. (R. 196: 16). Workman did not say he would not 
answer any more questions, rather Mallinson could just tell by Workman's demeanor. (R. 
196: 16). When Mallinson first called Workman, he identified himself only as Todd 
when Workman asked who he was. (R. 196: 17). At that time, he spoke freely. Then 
about the middle of the conversation, when they started talking specifically about the 
vehicle, and that it was stolen, Workman asked again who Mallinson was. Mallinson told 
him he was Detective Todd Mallinson from Utah County Major Crimes, and that is when 
Mallinson felt like Workman was being a little evasive. (R. 196: 17). 
Mallinson asked no further questions and Workman made no further comments. 
The conversation ended with Mallinson telling Workman that if he needed to talk to him 
further, he would call him back. (R. 196: 17). Workman indicated that would be okay. 
(R. 196: 17). 
Mallinson then transported the vehicle to the Pleasant Grove Police Department to 
do an inventory of the vehicle. Armstrong was transported to the police department 
where she was held temporarily until she was transported to the Utah County Jail. (R. 
196: 17). 
Under cross-examination, Detective Mallinson testified that in speaking with 
Armstrong, he determined that she had picked up the car from Workman at his residence 
in Salt Lake County. (R. 196: 18). Armstrong also told Mallinson that she had picked the 
car up on the 6th of January at about five o'clock then she had made a few stops and gone 
to a party. Armstrong also told Mallinson that when he had first observed her on the 
phone, she was calling Workman because she wanted to keep the car and did not want to 
go back to Salt Lake. (R. 196: 19). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Workman asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or in 
the alternative to quash bindover for improper venue in that he did not have control or 
constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah County. Alternatively, Workman also 
asserts that the trial court erred in denying the motion because the testimony presented 
shows that every element of the crime charged occurred in Salt Lake County. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WORKMAN'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR QUASH BINDOVER FOR IMPROPER VENUE 
Workman asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or in 
the alternative to quash bindover for improper venue in this matter when testimony 
showed that he did not have control or constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah 
County. Alternatively, Workman also asserts that the trial court erred in denying the 
motion because the testimony presented showed that every element of the crime charged 
occurred in Salt Lake County. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that criminal defendants 
"shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law[.]" Further, Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that the Defendant shall "have a speedy public trail by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed[.]" 
In support of these constitutional guarantees, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-202 
provides certain rules of venue. Subsection 76-l-202(l)(b) provides that when elements 
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of the offense occur in more than one county, the trial may be held in either county. The 
rule of statutory construction is that a specific provision of law takes precedent over more 
general provisions. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands and 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1992). Consequently, subsection 76-1-202(1 )(g)(iii) is 
more specific to the crime of theft and must take precedence over subsection (l)(b). 
Subsection (l)(g)(iii) provides that "[a] person who commits theft may be tried in any 
county in which he exerts control over the property affected." 
A. Workman did not have control of the vehicle in Utah County. 
Workman asserts that he relinquished control of the vehicle in Salt Lake County 
when he loaned the car to Armstrong. (R. 196: 13). Workman asserts that he disposed of 
the car through a bailment that was established when the possession and control of the car 
passed from him to Armstrong. McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 1992). 
Further, this bailment occurred in Salt Lake County. 
In McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302 (Utah 1992), former condominium lessees 
sued the lessor to recover for the loss of their personal property that was stored at the 
condominium. After being asked to leave the premises on short notice, an agreement was 
arranged that the McPhersons would leave their furniture at the condominium until they 
found a permanent place to store it. Belnap assured the McPhersons the property would 
be safe. After vacating the property, the McPhersons had no key or other access to their 
furniture except through Belnap. 
The court in McPherson held that "the creation of a bailment requires that 
possession and control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee." Id at 304. The 
court further held that "the bailor must actually or constructively deliver the properly to 
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the bailee in such a way as to entitle the bailee to exclude others from possession during 
the bailment period, including the owner/bailor." The court clarified this holding by 
stating, "This does not mean that to be a bailment, the bailee must be the only one who 
has access to the property. The bailee may allow others to access the property without 
destroying the bailment. The requirement is only that the bailee has the right to exclude 
all persons not covered by the agreement and to control the property.'' McPherson, 830 
P.2dat305. 
Workman asserts that he created a bailor/bailee relationship with Armstrong when 
he actually delivered the property to her and turned possession and control of the vehicle 
over to her. The facts show that Workman did not control where Armstrong was going, 
how she would get there, or agreeing that she could remain there. After leaving 
Workman, Armstrong told the officer she made a few stops and then attended a party. 
Armstrong also told Mallinson that when he had first observed her on the phone, she was 
calling Workman because she wanted to keep the car and did not want to go back to Salt 
Lake.(R. 196: 19). 
B. Workman did not have constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah County. 
Workman asserts that he did not have constructive possession of the car in Utah 
County. In State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911, Layman was convicted of the 
offenses of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession 
of paraphernalia. There was no evidence showing that Layman had actual possession of 
either the methamphetamine or the paraphernalia in the pouch carried by a passenger in 
the vehicle; therefore, the only basis for the conviction could have been that Layman was 
in constructive possession of the passenger's pouch and its contents. The question was 
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whether Layman had sufficient control over another person to prove constructive 
possession of something that person had in her physical possession. 
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), Fox was charged and convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute after discovering 
marijuana plants growing in a greenhouse attached to defendant's house. In affirming 
defendant's conviction, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish 
defendant's constructive possession of the marijuana where defendant owned the property 
and marijuana paraphernalia was found in defendant's bedroom and other rooms in the 
home. Because the greenhouse in which the marijuana was grown was accessible only 
through the house, there was a reasonable inference that defendant not only knew of the 
greenhouse and its contents but also exercised dominion and control over the marijuana 
growing therein and was responsible for growing the marijuana. The court held that 
constructive possession is proved by establishing a connection between the accused and 
the drug sufficient to permit an inference that the accused had both the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion or control over it. Id. at 319. The court held that in every 
case, the determination that someone has constructive possession of drugs is a factual 
determination that turns on the particular circumstances of the case. Further, that among 
these circumstances must be facts that permit the inference that the accused intended to 
use the drugs as his or her own. Id 
Workman asserts that there was little evidence presented to prove that he had the 
"ability and the intent to exercise dominion or control" over Armstrong's person in Utah 
County and that it is unreasonable to infer that he constructively possessed the car. The 
only fact tending to prove Mark's control over Armstrong is that she called him to let him 
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know that she would not be bringing the car back to him that evening. (R. 196:19). This 
simply is not enough. 
C. The testimony presented showed that every element of the crime charged 
occurred in Salt Lake County. 
Workman asserts that every element of the crime of theft, by receiving occurred in 
Salt Lake County. In State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), Cauble was charged, 
tried, and convicted of theft in Utah County. Cauble sold three trailers owned by his 
employer and received a check in payment. He then deposited the check in a bank in Salt 
Lake County. Id. at 776. Cauble's authority as a sales representative was limited to 
accepting payment, and he was to immediately turn over the payment to the appropriate 
personnel. Id. at 778. The court reasoned that when Cauble formed the intent in Utah 
County to keep the proceeds from the sale, failed to turn over the check to the appropriate 
personnel in Utah County, and failed to notify the company that a sale had occurred in 
Utah County that the elements of the offense were well established by his conduct, and 
therefore met the statutory requirement. The court held that the conduct of appellant that 
constituted the elements of the offense was found to have occurred to a "substantial 
degree" in Utah County; therefore, the venue was properly laid in Utah County. Id at 
779. 
Workman asserts that venue for this trial was improperly laid in Utah County, 
because the evidence presented in this case shows that for every element of the offense, 
the conduct of the appellant was found to have occurred to a "substantial degree" in Salt 
Lake County. The relevant elements of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property 
are: (1) receiving, retaining, or disposing of an automobile, and (2) knowing that the 
property had been stolen, or (3) believing that the property probably had been stolen, and 
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(4) intending to deprive the owner thereof. The testimony presented showed that 
Workman received the car in Salt Lake County, (R. 196: 14), retained possession of the 
car in Salt Lake County, (R. 196: 13), and disposed of the car in Salt Lake County (R. 
196: 13, 18). In addition, the knowledge or belief that the car was stolen and the intent to 
deprive the owner of the property occurred at the time of purchase, which occurred in Salt 
Lake County. (R. 196: 18). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Workman asks that this court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative quash bindover for improper venue, because the evidence 
presented in this case shows that he did not have control or constructive possession of the 
vehicle in Utah County. Alternatively, Workman asks that this court reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the motion because the testimony presented shows that every element of 
the crime for which he was charged occurred in Salt Lake County. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 2005. 
1/h~iysf 
Margaret 1*. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2nd day of June, 2005. 
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ADDENDA 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-408 
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76-6-406. Theft by extortion. 
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over the property of another by extortion and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof 
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person 
threatens to: 
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the. person 
threatened or to any other person or to property at any 
time; or 
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person 
to physical confinement or restraint; or 
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(h) Bring about or continue a stzike, boycott, or other 
similar collective action to obtain property which is not 
demanded or received for the benefit of the group which 
the actor purports to represent; or 
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself substan-
tially benefit him but which would harm substantially 
any other person with respect to that person's health, 
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, repu-
tation, or personal relationships. 1973 
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly deliv-
ered property. 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to 
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under 
a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the 
nature or amount of the property, without taking reason-
able measures to return it to the owner: and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the 
property when he obtains the property or at any time 
prior to taking the measures designated in paragraph (1). 
1973 
76-6-408. Rece iv ing stolen property — Dut ies of pawn-
brokers [Effective unti l January 1, 2005]. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or dis-
poses of the property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withliolds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the prop-
erty to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection CI) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property 
stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, 
retained, or disposed, acquires it for a consideration 
which he knows is far below its reasonable value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a 
pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise 
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tative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or 
obtains property and fails to require the seller or- person 
delivering the property to: 
f i» certify in writing, that he has the legal rights to 
sell the property: 
(ii» provide a legible print, preferably the right 
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate nexi to his 
signature: and 
(hi) provide at least one other positive form of 
picture id en tifi ca ti on. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchan-
dise or personal property and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply 
with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed 
to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it 
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption 
may be rebutted by proof. 
(4.) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears 
from the evidence tha t the defendant was a pawnbroker or a 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was 
an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant, bought, received, concealed, or 
withheld the property without obtaining the information re-
quired in Subsection (2Vd), then the burden shall be upon the 
defendant to show that the property bought, received, or 
obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2}(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap 
metal processors as defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6.) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or 
title or lending on the security of the property: 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of bu}dng 
or selling goods. 1993 
Receiv ing stolen property — Duties of 
pawnbrokers [Effective January 1, 2005]. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or dis-
poses of the property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the prop-
erty to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property 
stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand 
merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, 
receives, or obtains property and fails to require the seller 
or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, tha t he has the legal rights to 
sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right 
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to his 
signature; and 
(hi) provide at least one positive form of identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchan-
dise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply 
with the requirements of Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have 
been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption mav» 
rebutted by proof. ' e 
i'4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it apnea, 
from the evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker
 0r~ 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecti ° 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property or w 
an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker 
person, that the defendant, bought, received, concealed 
withheld the property without obtaining the information r 
quired in Subsection (2)fdi, then the burden shall be uponth 
defendant to show that the property bought, received 
obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(ci, (3), and (4) do not apply to serai 
metal processors as defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used m this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buyim 
or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, 0 
deals in the purchase, exchange, or possession 0 
personal property on condition of selling the sam 
property back again to the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal propert 
by taking chattel mortgage security on the propert 
and takes or receives the personal property into hi 
possession and who sells the unredeemed pledges; c 
(iiij receives personal property in exchange fa 
money or in trade for other personal property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, c 
title or lending on the security of the property. 2W 
76-6-409. Theft of s e rv i ce s . 
(1.) A person commits theft if he obtains sendees which h 
knows are available only for compensation by deceptioi 
threat , force, or any other means designed to avoid the di] 
payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over tt 
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is n< 
entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or to tl 
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited t 
labor, professional service, public utility and transportatic 
services, restaurant , hotel, motel, tourist cabin, roomii 
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipmeE 
tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone 1 
telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhil 
tions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge 
made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricil 
water, sewer, or cable television services, only if the servio 
are obtained by threat , force, or a form of deception n 
described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone servic 
onty if the services are obtained by threat , force, or a form 
deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-
409.9. is 
76-6-409.1. Dev ices for theft of services — Seizure ai 
destruct ion — Civil act ions for damages . 
(1) A person may not knowingly: 
(a) make or possess an3^ instrument, apparatus, equi 
ment, or device for the use of, or for the purpose 
committing or attempting to commit theft under Secti 
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or 
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or ol 
erwise transfer to another any information, instrunie: 
apparatus, equipment, or device, or any informant 
plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembli 
the same, with intent tha t it be used, or caused to be us< 
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)y his own conduct or that of another for which he is 
accountable, if: 
a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly 
thin the state; 
b' the conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt 
commit an offense within the state; 
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspir-
y to commit an offense within the state and an act in 
rtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state: or 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, 
licitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdic-
m an offense under the laws of both this state and the 
her jurisdiction. 
An offense is committed partly within this state if either 
ndnct which is any element of the offense, or the result 
is an element, occurs within this state. 
In homicide offenses, the "result" is either the physical 
:t which causes death or the death itself. 
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the 
tate, the death shall be presumed to have occurred 
dthin the state. 
(b) If jurisdiction is based on this presumption, this 
tate retains jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by 
lear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this 
state: and 
iii.) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in 
this state which is any element of the offense. 
An offense which is based on an omission to perform a 
imposed by the law of this state is committed within the 
regardless of the location of the offender at the time of 
•mission. 
la) If no jurisdictional issue is raised, the pleadings are 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
f b) The defendant may challenge jurisdiction by filing a 
motion before trial stating which facts exist tha t deprive 
the state of jurisdiction. 
(c) The burden is upon the state to initially establish 
jurisdiction over the offense by a preponderance of the 
evidence by showing under the provisions of Subsections 
(1) through (4) that the offense was committed either 
wholly or partly within the borders of the state. 
(d> If after the prosecution has met its burden of proof 
under Subsection (5)(.c) the defendant claims tha t the 
state is deprived of jurisdiction or may not exercise 
jurisdiction, the burden is upon the defendant to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) any facts claimed: and 
di) why those facts deprive the state of jurisdic-
tion. 
5) Facts that deprive the state of jurisdiction or prohibit 
state from exercising jurisdiction include the fact that the: 
(a.) defendant is serving in a position that is entitled to 
diplomatic immunity from prosecution and that the de-
fendant's country has not waived that diplomatic immu-
nity; 
(b) defendant is a member of the armed forces of 
another country and that the crime that he is alleged to 
have committed is one that due to an international 
agreement, such as a status of forces agreement between 
his country and the United States, cedes the exercise of 
jurisdiction over him for that offense to his country; 
ic) defendant is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe, 
as defined in Section 9-9-101, and that the Indian tribe 
has a legal status with the United States or the state that 
vests jurisdiction in either tribal or federal courts for 
certain offenses committed within the exterior boundaries 
of a tribal reservation, and that the facts establish tha t 
the crime is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or federal 
court; or 
I'd) offense occurred on land that is exclusively within 
federal jurisdiction. 
(71 (a) The Legislature finds that identity fraud under 
Chapter 6, Par t 11, Identity Fraud Act, involves the use of 
persona] identifying information which is uniquely per-
sonal to the consumer or business victim of that identity 
fraud and which information is considered to be in lawful 
possession of the consumer or business victim wherever 
the consumer or business victim currently resides or is 
found. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(aj. an offense which 
is based on a violation of Chapter 6, Part 11, Identity 
Fraud Act, is committed partly within this state, regard-
less of the location of the offender at the time of the 
offense, if the victim of the identity fraud resides or is 
found in this state. 
(8.) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 2004 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or 
precinct where the offense is alleged to have been committed. 
In determining the proper place of trial, the following provi-
sions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside 
the state is consummated within this state, the offender 
shall be tried in the county where the offense is consum-
mated. 
(b.) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or 
results that constitute elements, whether the conduct or 
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall 
occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may be 
held in any of the counties concerned. 
i c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of 
another is located in one county and his victim is located 
in another county at the time of the commission of the 
offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and 
death ensues in another county, the offender may be tried 
in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be 
tried in any county in which any act that is an element of 
the offense, including the agreement in conspiracy, is 
committed. 
ff) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, 
agrees, or at tempts to aid another in the planning or 
commission of an offense in another county, he may be 
tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and 
it cannot be readily determined in which county or district 
the offense occurred, the following provisions shall be 
applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any rail-
road car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft passing 
within this state, the offender may be tried in any 
county through which such railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body "of 
water bordering on or within this state, the offender 
may be tried in any county adjacent to such body of 
water. The words ''body of water" shall include but 
not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in 
any county in which he exerts control over the prop-
erty affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the 
boundary of two or more counties, trial of the offense 
may be held in any of such counties. 
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(v.! For any other offense, trial may be held in the 
county in which the defendant resides, or, if he has no 
fixed residence, in the county in which he is appre-
hended or to which he is extradited. 
i'h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter 
6, Part 11, Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the county: 
li> where the victim's personal identifying informa-
tion was obtained: 
(ii.) where the defendant used or attempted to use 
the personally identifying information; 
(hi) where the victim of the identity fraud resides 
oi" is found; or 
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in 
multiple jurisdictions, in any county where the vic-
tim's identity was used or obtained, or where the 
victim resides or is found. 
(2.) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a 
defendant unless made before trial. 2004 
P A R T S 
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 
76-1-301. Offenses for which prosecution may be com-
menced at any time. 
A prosecution for a capital felony, aggravated murder, mur-
der, manslaughter, child abuse homicide which is a second 
degree felon}; aggravated kidnapping, or child kidnapping 
may be commenced at any time. 2002 
76-1-301.5. Time l imitat ions for prosecut ion of misus-
ing publ ic monies , falsification or alteration 
of government records, and bribery. 
( D A prosecution for misusing public monies, falsification 
or alteration of government records, or for a bribery offense 
shall be commenced within two years after facts constituting 
the offense have been reported to a prosecutor having respon-
sibility and jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 
(2) This section does not shorten the limitation of actions 
under Section 76-1-302 or Subsection 76-1-303(3). 2002 
76-1-302. Time l imitat ions for prosecut ion of offenses 
— Provis ions if DNA evidence would identify 
the defendant — Commencement of prosecu-
tion. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced 
within four years after it is committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall 
be commenced within two 3'ears after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year 
after it is committed. 
(2) (a) A prosecution for the offenses listed in Subsections 
76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(A) through (P) may be commenced at 
any time if the identity of the person who committed the 
crime is unknown but DNA evidence is collected tha t 
would identify the person at a later date. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply if the s tatute of 
limitations on a crime has run as of May 5, 2003, and no 
charges have been filed. 
(3) If the statute of limitations would have run but for the 
provisions of Subsection (2) and identification of a perpetrator 
is made through DNA, a prosecution shall be commenced 
within one year of the discovery of the identity of the perpe-
trator. 
(4) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing 
of an indictment by a grand jury or upon the filing of a 
complaint or information. 2003 
76-1-303. Time l imitat ions for fraud or breach of f 
ciary obligation and misconduct of p u 
officer or employee . 
(1) If the period prescribed 111 Section 76-1-302 has ex pi 
a prosecution may be commenced for any offense a matt 
element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduc 
obligation within one year after discovery of the offense b 
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duti 
represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a part 
the offense. 
(2.) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitatio: 
provided in Section 76-1-302 by more than three years. 
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 7 
302 has expired, a prosecution may be commenced for: 
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office h 
public officer or public employee: 
(i) at any time during which the defendant hole 
public office or during the period of his public emp. 
ment; or 
(ii.) within two years after termination of del 
dant's public office or public employment. 
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5. Subs 
tion (3.) shall not extend the period of limitation otherw 
applicable by more than three years. 1 
76-1-303.5. Sexual offense against a child. 
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has 
pired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for rc 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexi 
abuse of a child, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child wit! 
four years after the report of the offense to a law enforceme 
agency. u 
i 
76-1-304. Defendant out of state — Plea held invalid 
N e w prosecut ions . 
(1) The period of limitation does not run against a 
defendant during any period of time in which the defendant 
out of the state following the commission of an offense. 
(2) If the defendant has entered into a plea agreement wi 
the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate I 
conviction, the period of limitation is suspended from the til 
of the entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement un' 
the time at which the conviction is determined to be mvali 
and that determination becomes final. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "final" means: 
(a) all appeals have been exhausted: 
(b) no judicial review is pending; and 
(c) no application for judicial review is pending. . 4 
(4) When the period of limitation is suspended p u r s u a n t 
Subsection (2), the suspension includes any charges to whic 
the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreemen 
charges which were dismissed as a result of a plea agreemen 
as well as any known charges which were not barred at tl 
time of entry of the plea. 
(5) Notwithstanding any other limitation, a prosecutic 
may be commenced for charges described in Subsection k 
within one year after a plea entered pursuant to a pi* 
agreement has been determined to be invalid, and tha t dete 
mination becomes final. w 
76-1-305. Lesser inc luded offense for which period < 
l imitat ions has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for whif 
the period of limitations has not run and the defendant shoig 
be found guilty of a lesser offense for which the period 
limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and include 
offense against which the statute of limitations has run she 
not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 1-
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The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss 
for Improper Venue, or in the Alternative, Motion to Quash Bindover Order; and the Court having 
carefully considered the Motions and PlaintifP s Responses thereto; and the Court being fully advised 
in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now make the following Ruling: 
Noting the facts relative to the incident in question and submitted authorities; the Court is 
persuaded by Plaintiffs arguments and authorities which the Court adopts and incorporates in this 
Ruling. Defendant's Motions, therefore, are respectfully denied. 
Dated this 2 - / day of May 2003. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
MARK WORKMAN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) CASE NUMBER: 001400742 
1 MOTION DISMISS FOR 
IMPROPER VENUE or in the 
1 alternative MOTION TO 
QUASH BINDOVER ORDER 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
Comes Now, Defendant, Mark Workman, by and through his 
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to the 6th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Article I §12 
of the Constitution of Utah and §76-1-202, Utah Code, who hereby 
respectfully moves for this Court's Order that this matter be 
-dismissed for reason of lack of venue in Utah County, or in the 
alternative that this Court quash the Bindover Order previously 
issued after the preliminary examination conducted in this 
matter, also for the reason that venue is not proper in Utah 
County. 
FACTS 
Defendant asserts that the facts relevant to this 
motion are as follows: 
1. Defendant is charged by the Utah County Attorney 
with THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second Degree Felony, 
alleging that Defendant, on or about 7 January, 2000, received, 
retained, or disposed of an automobile belonging to another, 
knowing that the property had been stolen, or believing that the 
property probably had been stolen, or that he concealed, sold, or 
withheld the property or that he aided in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property also knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that the property probably had been stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner thereof. 
2. At the time of the alleged offense, the filing of 
the Information, the preliminary examination, and presently 
Defendant has and does reside in Salt Lake County. 
3. At the preliminary examination held in this matter, 
Detective Todd Mallinson testified for the State substantially as 
follows (a transcript of the preliminary examination is in the 
file of this matter): 
2 
a. Detective Mallinson first observed a car in 
Orem City, Utah County at a 7-11 and eventually stopped the car 
on 1-15 in Utah; it was being driven by Holly Armstrong; through 
a check with dispatch the car was reported stolen; Tr. 7:17 
through 13:2. 
b. On information gained from the driver, 
Detective Mallinson called Defendant by telephone, presumably at 
his residence in Murray, Salt Lake County; during said call 
Defendant allegedly made statements that he had been in 
possession of the car in Salt Lake County and had loaned the car 
to Holly Armstrong in Salt Lake County; Tr. 13:3 through 14:13. 
c. On cross examination, Detective Mallinson 
indicated that Ms. Armstrong told him she had picked up the car 
at Defendant's residence in Salt Lake County at about 5:00pm the 
day before; that she had gone to a party and had stopped at a 7-
11 where the officer had first seen her to call Defendant to tell 
him she didn't want to go back to Salt lake County that she 
wanted to keep the car. 
3 
LAW 
1. The 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States(made applicable to State actions by the 14th Amendment) 
provides that the Defendant "shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law[.]" 
2. Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that the Defendant shall "have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed[.]" 
3. To implement these two constitutional guarantees 
§76-1-202 provides certain rules of venue. Sub-section 76-1-
202(1)(b) provides that when elements of the offense occur in 
more than one county trial may be held in either county. 
Subsection 76-1-202(g)(iii) is more particular to the crime of 
theft and provides that "[a] person who commits theft may be 
tried in any county in which he exerts control over the property 
affected." 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Taken in the light most favorable to the State the 
evidence admitted at the preliminary examination established that 
Defendant may have retained and disposed of the automobile in 
Salt Lake County. No evidence was admitted that established that 
the Defendant did so in Utah County or aided another in doing so. 
While the evidence established that Ms. Armstrong retained the 
vehicle within Utah County, her actions cannot be attributed to 
the Defendant. 
First, the evidence established that Defendant 
completed any retention or disposing of the car in Salt Lake 
County on the 6th of January. At the time that possession of the 
vehicle was transferred from the Defendant to Ms. Armstrong on 
the evening of the 6th, Defendant ceased to retain the vehicle 
and had completed the act of disposing of the vehicle, all within 
Salt Lake County. If after disposing of the vehicle to Ms. 
Armstrong it can be said that Defendant also continued to retain 
the vehicle, the term "dispose" would have no meaning in the 
statute. This would violate the rule of statutory construction 
that all terms of a statute are presumed to have been used 
advisedly by the legislature. See Board of Education of Granite 
5 
School District v Salt lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 1035 (Utah, 
1983). Therefore, all of the elements of theft by receiving that 
have been alleged against Defendant occurred in Salt Lake County, 
only. 
The evidence established that Ms. Armstrong's decisions 
to commit some elements of her own retention of the vehicle in 
Utah County were her independent actions based on her own 
independent decisions, not aided encouraged or directed by the 
Defendant. No evidence established that Defendant directed or 
even knew that Ms. Armstrong would bring the vehicle into Utah 
County. Defendant was not present with the car in Utah County and 
had no nexus to the car in Utah County. Ms. Armstrong's retention 
was therefore her own separate act. 
Second, the more specific section of the venue statute 
(76-1-202(g) (iii)) directs that the trial of the charges against 
Defendant be held where "he exerts control over the property 
affected." An excepted precept of statutory construction is that 
specific provisions of law take precedent over more general 
provisions. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v Board of State 
Lands and Forestry, 830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah, 1992). Consequently, 
sub-section (1)(g)(iii) which is specific to crimes of theft must 
6 
take precedence over sub-section (1)(b) which is general in 
application. As stated above, the evidence presented at the 
preliminary examination established only that Defendant exerted 
control over the vehicle in Salt Lake County at which place he 
handed over control to Ms. Armstrong. In contrast, no evidence 
established that Defendant aided Ms. Armstrong in the control she 
independently exerted over the car in Utah County, such as 
directions to her to take the car to Utah County, agreeing with 
her that she could take the car to Utah County, being with her 
while she took the car to Utah County, jointly controlling the 
car with her in Utah County. 
CONCLUSION 
The State may have established that Defendant completed 
an act of receiving, retaining, or disposing of the stolen car in 
Salt lake County. The State did not present any evidence from 
which the magistrate could have concluded that Defendant 
personally received, retained, or disposed of the car in Utah 
County. Neither did the State establish probable cause to 
conclude that Defendant aided Ms. Armstrong in her independent 
act of retaining the car in Utah County first because there was 
no evidence to establish that Defendant had knowledge of or 
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encouraged her in bringing the car to Utah County. And, second, 
and more importantly, the specific requirement that Defendant 
exerted control over the car in Utah County was not established 
because State established that Defendant had already disposed of 
the car (therefore culminating his control over the car) in Salt 
Lake County. 
Therefore Defendant moves for this Court's order that 
this matter be dismissed for lack of venue to try this Defendant 
in Utah County or alternatively, that this Court quash the 
Bindover order of the magistrate also for the reason that the 
State failed to establish at the preliminary examination that 
Defendant's alleged crime occurred in Utah County. 
Dated this //[Vfciay of April, 2003. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
o-KL 
>u 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK WORKMAN 
Defendant(s). 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR QUASH BIND-OVER 
Case No. 001400742 
JUDGE FRED D. HOWARD 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and through its counsel of record 
Curtis L. Larson, and responds to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
or in the alternative, Quash the Bind-Over as follows: 
PERTINENT FACTS 
1. State stipulates to the facts presented by the defendant in 
his motion that are based upon the record of the Preliminary 
Hearing. 
2. That State submits the following additions to the facts 
which were brought forward at the Preliminary Hearing: 
a. Defendant "loaned" the car to Armstrong. 
b. Defendant received a call from Armstrong, in Utah 
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County, detailing her desire not to return the car to 
him that night, but keep it in Utah County. 
c. It is unsure where the defendant was at the time of 
this call: He could have been in Salt Lake, or Utah 
County. 
d. That the defendant received a call from the officer, 
who was in Utah County with the vehicle, and was asked 
questions regarding the vehicle: Again it was unknown 
at the time of the call where the defendant was as he 
was on a cellphone. 
e. That the defendant declared his ownership of the 
vehicle to the officer, while it was sitting, in police 
custody, in Utah County. 
f. That the title defendant claimed to the vehicle, and 
located in the vehicle, was to a completely different 
vehicle. 
g. That the defendant paid $900 down, on a $3600 purchase 
price for a vehicle that was valued at $9,282.00. 
VENUE ARGUMENT 
State7 s counsel has reviewed his arguments made at the 
conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing (Tr. 21:6 - 22:19, and 24:9 
~ 25:14), and, believing them to be well-found, and articulate, 
re-iterates them through their incorporation into this response. 
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The Statute in question in defendant's motion is 76-1-202. 
It states in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, 
or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed. In determining the proper place of trial, the 
following provisions shall apply: . . . 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or 
results that constitute elements, whether the conduct or 
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall 
occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may be 
held in any of the counties concerned. . . . 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it 
cannot be readily determined in which county or district the 
offense occurred, the following provisions shall be 
applicable: . . . (iii) A person who commits theft may be 
tried in any county in which he exerts control over the 
property affected. 
In State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955), the 
court held that venue was not an element of the offense of 
murder, so it was sufficient that proof of venue be by a 
"preponderance of the evidence." This is very low standard, and 
is demonstrated in State v Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P2d 750 (1936). 
In Green, the court found prima facia proof of proper venue when 
a witness simply had the "impression" that a certain place was in 
"Salt Lake County." 
In State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), the court 
directed that in determining the proper place of trial, where two 
or more counties are involved, the venue statute provides that 
trial may be held in any of the counties in which the conduct 
constitutes the elements of the offense charged. 
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In Cauble, the defendant obtained possession of a check in a 
business transaction, and formulated the intent to deprive the 
owner thereof, in Utah County. He then took the check to Salt 
Lake County and deposited it in a bank account. Defendant was 
charged and tried in Utah County. On appeal the defendant argued 
that Utah County was not the proper venue, as the actual 
unauthorized control of the check was in Salt Lake County. The 
court held: 
The elements of theft under the Utah Code are that appellant 
(1) obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
another's property, and (2) that he had a purpose to deprive 
the owner of the property. . . . 
The most difficult question arises as to when appellant's 
control over the money became unauthorized -- when he 
received the check into his possession at the time the sale 
was made in Utah County, or when he deposited the check into 
his personal account at Tracy-Collins Bank in Salt Lake 
County. Appellant claims that he was authorized to accept 
money on behalf of Western Leisure and, therefore, no crime 
could have occurred until the property was actually 
converted to his own use at the Salt Lake bank. The record 
does not support this contention. . . . 
It seems clear that when appellant formed the intent in Utah 
County to keep the proceeds from the Wheelwright sale; when 
he failed to deliver the check to Mrs. Peterson; and, 
further, when he failed to notify the company that a sale 
had even been made, that the elements of the offense were 
well established by his conduct at that point in time, and 
therefore meet the statutory requirement. . . . 
Appellant has contended that the unlawful conduct did not 
occur until the bank in Salt Lake City accepted the check 
from him. Banking practices can be used as one measure to 
determine when and where the crime was technically 
committed, and we find authority to support the view that 
since a bank does not recognize a transaction as complete 
until final payment from the originating bank is cleared, an 
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offense of embezzlement is begun in the county where the 
check is drawn and completed in the county where it is 
ultimately paid. In the instant case, the check in question 
originated in Utah County and was ultimately paid there. 
Regardless of the standard applied herein, the conduct of 
appellant which constitutes the elements of the offense is 
found to have occurred to a substantial degree in Utah 
County. We find that venue was properly laid in Utah County. 
. . . [Footnotes and Citations omitted.] 
Similar to the circumstances in Cauble, presumably, the 
defendant took possession of the vehicle, and formed the intent 
to permanently deprive the owner thereof on Salt Lake County. He 
then retained possession of that stolen vehicle in Utah County by 
his exercising authority over it in a telephone conversation with 
Holly Armstrong, and the Officer. He indicated he was the owner 
of the vehicle, and had loaned it to Armstrong. As he loaned the 
car to Armstrong, he exerted possessory rights to it in Utah 
County, or wherever else she went, as he expected her to bring it 
back, which is evidenced by the fact that she would call him from 
Utha County to gain an extension of the time for return. To our 
knowledge, Armstrong was never encouraged to return the vehicle 
to the rightful owner, but only to the person whom she recognized 
as such—which was the defendant. 
Defendant argues the need for defendant's "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle: That "he" had to be in the vehicle in 
Utah County at the time of the stop. State disagrees and has 
previously in argument indicated that the courts readily accept 
the concept of "constructive possession." State v Lyman, 1999 UT 
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79. State renews the applicability of this argument. 
Applying the "preponderance" standard as espoused in 
Mitchell, supra., the State has met its burden of showing that 
venue in this matter is correct with the 4th District Court. 
Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon improper 
venue should be denied. 
QUASH BIND-OVER ARGUMENT 
The defendant argues that as the State filed to provide a 
showing of proper venue, the bind-over should be dismissed. He 
argues it in the alternative, however the state does not see it 
as an argument in the alternative as it is part and parcel of 
venue argument. Should the Court decide that venue was 
established, than the bind-over was, and remains, correct, and 
this matter should go further to trial. 
Similar to requirement for establishing venue, the courts 
have held that the standard for bind-over is a "preponderance" of 
the evidence, as viewed in light of all inferences being drawn in 
favor of the State. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Utah 
decided the case of State v Clark, 2001 UT 9. In that case the 
court delineated the standard of proof required at a preliminary 
hearing. It stated: 
[W]e hold that the quantum of evidence necessary to support 
a bind-over is less than that necessary to survive a 
directed verdict motion. Specifically, we see no principled 
basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the 
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arrest warrant probable cause standard and the preliminary 
hearing probable cause standard. Our efforts to articulate 
a standard that is more rigorous than the arrest warrant 
standard and is still lower that a preponderance of the 
evidence standard have only resulted in confusion. 
Therefore, at both the arrest warrant and the preliminary 
hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense was 
committed and that the defendant committed it. [Citation and 
footnote omitted.] This "reasonable belief" standard has the 
advantage of being more easily understood while still 
allowing the magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of 
the preliminary hearing, "ferreting out . . . groundless and 
improvident prosecutions." [Citation omitted.] Clark at 116. 
In State v Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995), the Supreme 
Court of Utah instructed: 
Preliminary hearings are adversarial proceedings in which 
the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to 
establish that "the crime charged has been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it." Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(h) (2). "The prosecution is not required to introduce 
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence 
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of 
fact." Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783. In making a determination 
as to probable cause, the magistrate should view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and 
resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution. People 
v. District Court, 779 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); 
State v. Starks, 249 Kan. 516, 820 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Kan. 
1991); see also Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 510 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1986) ("There is a presumption that the State 
will strengthen its evidence at trial."). Moreover, "unless 
the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate should bind the 
defendant over for trial. Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 
(Utah 1983) (setting out standard for directed verdict in 
civil case). Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. [Emphasis added.] 
In State v Talbot, 356 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1998) the 
Utah State Supreme Court directed: 
7 
[P]ertinent to the standard for establishing probable 
cause at a preliminary hearing [are]: (i) the quantum 
of the evidence required to establish probable cause; 
(ii) the extent of the magistrate's freedom to review 
the credibility of evidence presented at the hearing; 
and (iii) the limitations on a magistrate's ability to 
choose between credible but conflicting evidence. 
Talbot, 356 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
Continuing, the court re-affirmed: 
This is not a trial on the merits, only a gateway to 
the finder of fact. Therefore, "the magistrate should 
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution.77 Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. Talbot, 356 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
In this matter, the statute in play is Section 76-6-408(1), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which details the elements 
of the offense: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or 
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing 
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of 
it. 
In this case, the evidence introduced at Preliminary Hearing 
show that the defendant committed the alleged crime of Receiving 
Stolen Property in Utah County. Based upon the evidence in this 
matter, the jury can appropriately draw a conclusion that the 
defendant committed the crime charged. 
In the preliminary hearing, the magistrate is only making a 
limited determination that probable cause exists which warrants 
submission of the case to the trier of fact. According the 
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supreme court, this is "a reasonable belief that an offense was 
committed and that the defendant committed it." Clark at 116. 
And, "[t]his probable cause standard Ais lower, even, than a 
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil 
cases/" Talbot, 356 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, Anderson, 612 P2d at 
783. "[UJnless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate should bind the defendant 
over for trial. Pledger, supra, quoting, Cruz v Montoya, supra. 
Further ,T[t]he prosecution is not required to introduce 
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence 
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of 
fact." State v Anderson, supra. 
The state maintains it has presented the quantum of 
evidence necessary to satisfy it's burden of proof at a 
Preliminary Hearing to establish that the crime charge was 
committed, and that the defendant committed it. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute in issue makes this court the proper venue for 
this offense. The fact that it could have been brought in Salt 
Lake County does not defeat the venue of this court. The State 
has provided the sufficient preponderance of evidence necessary 
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for the bind-over order. 
Plaintiff requests the court deny Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, or in the alternative, Quash of Bind-Over Order, for the 
foregoing reasons. 
is 1 ?/j^day of ^f^L 
Respectfully submitted this ry day o f y^^j^ 2003. 
Curtis L. Larson 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served a true and correct copy of this 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bind-Over, via 
US/Inter-Office, Mail, this H/*V day of £*/)(£-£ , 2003, on 
Mr. Tom Means 
PD Office 
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